![]() Of the two most disturbing events in my childhood, one was the experience of the Bengal famine of 1943, in which, it is now estimated, around three million people died. Here perhaps I would be forgiven for indulging in some childhood reminiscences, which actually had a rather decisive impact on the directions of my interests and involvements later on. Some of the most distressing problems of social ethics are deeply economic in nature. This will be so not just because I happen to be primarily an economist by profession (though often taking the liberty of jumping into ethical debates), but also because I believe that economic analysis has something to contribute to substantive ethics in the world in which we live. Many of the examples chosen will involve economic phenomena. ![]() I shall attempt to illustrate the implications of this view with problems drawn from real life. While I shall try to discuss the basic ideas underlying individual freedom seen as a social commitment, my primary concern in this paper is with the practical relevance of this view. And it can have, I shall argue, far-reaching implications for the assessment of social institutions and public policy. ![]() For the analysis of contemporary society, this perspective has, I believe, some significant merits over other approaches-for example the utilitarian calculus of pleasure and desire that implicitly or explicitly underlies much social policy today. I am concerned here with a view of social ethics that sees individual freedom both (1) as a central value in any appraisal of society, and (2) as an integral product of social arrangements. I would like to examine the implications of seeing individual freedom as a social commitment. The following address was given at the award ceremony in Turin for the second Senator Giovanni Agnelli International Prize.
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